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Differential framing occurs when individuals with different latent motives assign 
qualitatively different meanings to the same attributes or events in the environment 
(James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & McIntyre, 1996). The implications of this 
phenomenon for the explanation and prediction of behavior are substantial: In perfectly 
logical fashions, individuals in exactly the same situation have qualitatively different 
experiences. In this way, differential framing mediates the relationship between motives 
and the behaviors that comprise traits. This dissertation tested several propositions 
associated with this phenomenon, and the results tentatively suggest that individuals with 

















 The modern workplace is an information-rich environment, and the stimuli 
available to employees on a daily basis are diverse and numerous. Meeting requests, 
office jokes, feedback sessions, policy modifications, status reports, supervisor 
presentations, and organizational calls-to-action are just some of the events to which 
employees may attend. Yet for their abundance and salience, these attributes of the 
workplace hold no particular meaning for employees until they are given some type of 
interpretation (Hamilton, 2005). That is, information in the workplace is evaluatively 
ambiguous until an employee imposes his or her evaluation on it. This process by which 
information is placed into an interpretative category and evaluated (i.e., given meaning) 
is called framing (James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & McIntrye, 1996), and it is an 
important step that informs subsequent judgments, affective reactions, decisions, and 
behaviors (Hamilton, 2005). In this way, framing forms the basis of how individuals 
reason and adapt to their environments – such as the workplace. 
Differential framing occurs when stimuli – people, events, environments – are 
assigned qualitatively disparate meanings by individuals with different latent motives 
(James & Mazerolle, 2002). Latent motives are unconscious and largely inaccessible to 
the individual, and their impact on reasoning (i.e., the framing and analysis of stimulus 
information) is the centerpiece of what James and colleagues (James, 1998; James & 
Mazerolle, 2002; James & McIntyre, 1996) refer to as conditional reasoning. Conditional 
reasoning means that the outcome of the reasoning process is conditional on the 
 2
personality of the individual doing the reasoning. That is, what is considered a reasonable 
and justified behavioral adjustment to the environment will be determined by the 
personality of the reasoner (James, 1998).  
The core assumption of conditional reasoning is that individuals like to believe 
that – for the most part – they behave sensibly and rationally, as opposed to irrationally or 
foolishly (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002). Accordingly, people tend to frame 
and analyze the world in ways that justify the expression of behavior to which they are 
predisposed. Evidence for this can be found in the reasons people provide for their 
behavior (see James, 1998). This assumption is congruent with other theories about how 
individuals equilibrate their cognitions and behavior (Bem, 1967, 1972; Festinger, 1957; 
see also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and is central to understanding how framing is a critical 
link to behavior: (a) People want to behave in certain ways, and (b) they want to believe 
their behavior is rational and sensible. The result of these twin desires is that individuals 
interpret information from the environment in a manner that that will allow them to 
justify their desired behavior. For example, a person prone to violence and desirous of 
acting out violently likely will interpret stimulus information in the environment in a way 
that will justify violent behavior. Walking down a city street, a violence-prone individual 
likely will interpret (i.e., frame) a comment from a homeless person in way that justifies a 
violent response (i.e., a behavioral adjustment to the environment), while a person 
motivated to act non-violently will interpret the comment in a manner that justifies a non-
violent response. This implies that the meaning assigned to the stimulus information will 
differ depending on the latent motives of the perceivers. This is differential framing.  
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This dissertation examined differential framing through the lens of organizational 
culture, the shared norms, values, and assumptions within an organization (Schein, 1996). 
The goal was to highlight how individuals with different latent motives can come to 
assign qualitatively distinct meanings to the same organizational culture. In doing so, this 
study aimed to make several important contributions to the broad field of organizational 
science. First, evidence of the differential framing of organizational cultures would 
elucidate how individuals with different personalities can agree on the intensity of a 
culture (i.e., its strength) yet regard the direction of the culture (i.e., its nature) quite 
differently. Such a distinction answers calls for research to distinguish the meaning 
employees impute to the workplace from those assumed by researchers (e.g., Rentsch, 
1990). Second, the elucidation of differential framing would specify a mechanism by 
which individual motives compel the behaviors that come to comprise traits. As will be 
discussed, motives and traits are distinct concepts, and the establishment of a critical 
explanatory link between the two will help bridge the gap between the trait and social-
cognitive approaches to the study of personality (Cervone, 1991). Finally, the operation 
of differential framing among individuals dominated by the motives to achieve and avoid 
failure would contribute both to the understanding of those motives and the conditional-
reasoning approach to personality put forth by James and colleagues (e.g., James, 1998). 
This dissertation aims to clarify and extend  personality theory, provide an account of 
individual differences in the assignment of meaning, and illustrate but one potential 




Framing as Social Cognition 
Conceptualizations of the term framing have taken many forms over the last 
several decades, and for the sake of clarity it is necessary to distinguish among the them. 
For example, sociologists have employed the concept of frames to investigate how social 
movements and collective actions engage and galvanize individuals (e.g., Benford & 
Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974); cognitive psychologists have referred to framing in the 
determination of how individuals make decisions amid uncertainty (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981); theorists of artificial intelligence have used frames to describe 
structures of information (Minksy, 1975); and scholars of media effects (e.g., Pan & 
Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele, 1999), political science (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007), and 
public policy (e.g., Schon & Rein, 1994) have used frames to better understand the nature 
and impact of political communication. Though not unrelated to these research traditions, 
framing as it is addressed in this paper belongs in the domain of social cognition, which 
pertains to how individuals process, store and use information from the social world 
(Hamilton, 2005).  
Framing in the Cognitive Process 
Several information-processing steps are believed to occur between the time an 
individual initially encounters stimulus information in the social environment and when 
he or she ultimately responds to it (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The first step in this process 
involves selecting information from the environment for processing and takes the form of 
attention. In the workplace, individuals may direct their attention to information in the 
environment by participating in a department-wide survey of worker attitudes, listening 
to the explanation a supervisor provides for a policy, or opening and reading an e-mail 
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from a colleague, among other possible scenarios. Note that as described above, this 
information, though attended to by the perceiver, does not hold any particular meaning 
until it undergoes individual interpretation. This assignment of meaning to the stimulus 
information immediately follows the selection of information from the environment 
(Hamilton, 2005) and is the locus of framing. Following attention and interpretation of 
information from the stimulus environment, individuals elaborate on their interpretations 
by drawing inferences based on them (Bruner, 1957a; Heider, 1958). For example, an 
employee may be told that his company is enacting a hiring freeze and no new employees 
will be hired until the following fiscal year. Once the employee interprets this 
information, he may then infer that the company’s financial health is less than sound and 
no new business plans will be put in motion in the immediate future. In the next step of 
the cognitive process, the employee would represent this information in his memory for 
later recall (Hamilton, 2005), such as when trying to determine if he should tell his 
supervisor about an innovative idea for a new product, given his inference about the 
company’s financial well-being. Ultimately, attending to the company hiring freeze, 
interpreting its content, and inferring additional attributes about the message all influence 
the employee’s decision about whether or not to promote his innovative idea. Such 
judgments, decisions, affective reactions, and behaviors are the end products of the 
cognitive process (Hamilton, 2005). 
The Meaning of Meaning 
The content of the “meaning” an individual assigns to stimulus information in the 
environment has evaluative and descriptive components (cf. Morris, 1946; Osgood, Suci, 
& Tannenbaum, 1957), the latter of which takes place immediately following the 
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selection of information from the environment (James & James, 1989). During this 
meaning analysis (James & James, 1989), individuals engage stored mental 
representations or schemata to make sense of and describe the incoming information. 
Schemata are thought of as generic knowledge structures that tend to hold across repeated 
instantiations of similar stimuli (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and the cognitive focus during 
this analysis is on determining if features of the stimuli information are consistent with 
the individual’s schema for that information. Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, 1990; 
Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986) refer to this initial step as identification, during which 
the perceiver relates the stimulus to a standard. The second component involved in the 
determination of meaning involves an individual’s valuation of the stimulus information 
(Mandler, 1982). Valuation is an internally-oriented process in which individuals 
determine how much value they perceive in the stimuli (James & James, 1989), and 
Mandler (1982) differentiates the descriptive and evaluative components thusly: 
Descriptive judgments seem to depend primarily on information that is “out 
there.” Evaluative judgments apparently do not. We may agree that “the tree is 
green” but we may argue whether “the tree is beautiful.” …The value judgments 
seem to require something about “beautiful” that “belongs” to the speaker. (pp. 8-
9) 
This final observation about the evaluative meaning of information deriving from within 
the individual – and the tacit assumption that individuals differ along a variety of 





James & Mazerolle (2002) state that “to frame an event is to place the event in an 
interpretative category” (p. 35) or a cognitive schema. Schemata are cognitive structures 
that (a) represent an individual’s knowledge about a particular concept, (b) develop 
through experience with other people, events, and situations, and (c) influence the 
processing of new information from the earliest moments of perception (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991). Researchers have explored how individuals use schemata to process information 
about the self (Markus, 1977); other individuals (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979; 
Catrambone & Markus, 1987; Fong & Markus, 1982), commonplace events (e.g., Schank 
& Abelson, 1977), and the workplace (e.g., Lord & Foti, 1986). Schemata expedite 
cognitive processing by allowing individuals to draw on previously acquired (and stored) 
knowledge in the comprehension of new information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). As 
conceptualized by James & Mazerolle (2002) in the framing process, schemata are 
“internal prisms through which external stimuli pass, and in passing they are translated 
into interpretative adjectives that indicate personal meaning” (p. 35). Thus, at the process 
level, framing is the deployment of knowledge structures acquired through experience to 
sort stimuli into categories of personal meaning to the perceiver.  
Availability 
 For an individual to use a knowledge structure (i.e., a schema) to process 
information from the environment, at the very minimum the individual must be in 
possession of the knowledge. Availability refers to whether an individual has stored in 
memory a schema to be used in processing social input (Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins, 
King, & Mavin, 1982). Consider how conditions related to availability may lead 
 8
individuals to assign different meanings to the same stimuli. For instance, an individual 
who has driven an automobile to work at a business park every day for 20 years likely 
has available a knowledge structure associated with employee parking. On the other 
hand, a person who has taken the train to an office in the city over the same 20-year 
period quite possibly does not have an available “parking” schema. Hence, when 
processing social input such as a company’s offer of free employee parking, the two 
individuals do not have the same schema available to interpret the information. As a 
result, the individuals – one with an available schema, the other without – assign different 
meanings to the same offer of free employee parking. A similar discrepancy would arise 
when two individuals have available to them schemata that pertain to a “meeting with the 
boss” but the contents of the schemata differ between the individuals. To the employee 
who knows only accolades and promotions, a “meeting with the boss” might be construed 
in favorable terms, while the employee who has been repeatedly reprimanded and 
demoted would interpret “meeting with the boss” quite differently. These examples 
illustrate how the availability of a schema is a necessary – but not sufficient – condition 
for an individual to use the schema in processing information from the social world 
(Higgins & King, 1981). However, for the schema to be used in the processing of 
information, an individual must also have access to the knowledge structure.  
Accessibility 
 Bruner (1957b) first referred to accessibility as the ease with which a stored 
mental representation such as a schema is used to categorize or interpret stimulus 
information from the environment. Since then, Bruner’s description of the “perceptual 
readiness” of a schema or category has been refined to refer specifically to the potential 
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of the available knowledge to be activated (Higgins, 1996, 1999), allowing for the 
possibility that under certain conditions accessible schemata will be inappropriate for use. 
Where Kelly (1955) described personal constructs as relatively habitual ways different 
individuals use different categories to interpret their environments, Bruner focused on 
accessibility as a temporary result of goals. Unification of the paradigms and the research 
that followed them (e.g., Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; 
Markus, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979) arrived when Bargh and colleagues formalized the 
distinction between temporary accessibility and chronic accessibility (Bargh, Bond, 
Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh, 1994). Temporary accessibility occurs when a schema 
has recently been activated or primed, such as when a supervisor’s request for a meeting 
activates a knowledge structure for “meeting with the boss.” Chronic accessibility refers 
to the high activation readiness of a schema or knowledge structure across a variety of 
situations, and such accessible schemata are less stimulus-dependent. For instance, a 
highly “opportunistic” person would have chronically accessible schemata that would 
contribute to processing multiple environments in terms of how they potentially might 
benefit the individual.  
It is chronically accessible schemata that yield the framing proclivities described 
by James and Mazerolle (2002) as tendencies to use select adjectives to construe similar 
events. That is, individuals with strong dispositions to engage in certain behaviors rely on 
the same schemata to interpret attributes of the environment in terms where the 
behavioral response is one that is sensible, logical, and justified. These chronically 
accessible concepts operate at higher levels of readiness than non-chronic schemata 
(Bargh & Pratto, 1986), are used to interpret the behavior of others (Higgins, King, & 
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Mavin, 1982), and guide processing when information is vague (Higgins & Brendl, 1995; 
Lau, 1989). Additionally, repeated use of the same schema or construct contributes to it 
becoming a chronically accessible structure (Higgins & King, 1981), which means that 
the more the schema is used to interpret environmental stimuli the more readily it will be 
activated for future interpretations. Subsequently, social-information processing becomes 
relatively involuntary or automatic, and individuals come to interpret information with 
little effort or conscious awareness (see Bargh, 1994; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). This is how individuals with different motives to engage in 
different behaviors come to unconsciously interpret the same attributes of the 
environment in qualitatively different – but perfectly logical – ways: Over time, the needs 
to behave in a certain way and regard the behavior as logical and appropriate facilitate 
framing proclivities, which are based on the chronic accessibility of the relevant 
schemata. As will be further illustrated when the discussion turns to the traits of 
“achievement motivation” and “fear of failure,” the use of stored mental representations 
in the processing of environmental stimuli also is determined by the fit between the 
stimulus and relevant schema (Higgins, 1996). More detailed discussions of accessibility 
can be found elsewhere (e.g., Förster & Liberman, 2007; Higgins, 1996), but the impact 
of readily (and habitually) retrievable knowledge structures on differential framing is 
profound. Individuals with different chronically accessible schemata use different 
schemata to automatically interpret the very same event or attribute of the environment. 





When individuals assign qualitatively different meanings to the same stimulus, 
they do so to satisfy two related motives. The first motive is the individual’s underlying 
predisposition to behave in a certain way. For example, a person with an aggressive 
disposition has an underlying need to behave aggressively and thus seeks outlet for this 
tendency. The concomitant motive is the desire to believe that the behavior evinced by 
the need is reasonable and logical, as opposed foolish or irrational (James, 1998). Thus, 
the aggressive person frames environmental stimuli in ways that permit the self-
perception of aggressive acts as rational and logical responses. Indeed, the meaning or 
psychological significance stimulus information holds for individuals is determined by 
the degree to which the information justifies the motivated behavior (James & Mazerolle, 
2002). In summary, the process is as follows: (1) An individual is motivated to engage in 
a particular behavior; (2) this motive is attended by a desire to perceive the behavior as a 
sensible adjustment to the environment; as a result, (3) stimulus information from the 
environment is interpreted in a way that facilitates both the expression of the motivated 
behavior and perception of motivated behavior as logical. Hence, individuals with 
different motives assign qualitatively different meanings to the same stimuli.  
Justification Mechanisms 
To satisfy the need to self-perceive their behavior as rational and appropriate, 
individuals rely on implicit reasoning biases to enhance the logical appeal of the behavior 
in which they are predisposed to engage (James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002). 
Because these biases serve to justify the motivated behavior to the individual, James 
(1998) refers to these biases as justification mechanisms (JMs) and defines them as 
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“implicit biases whose purpose is to define, shape, and otherwise influence reasoning so 
as to enhance the rational appeal of behaving in a manner consistent with a disposition or 
motive” (James & Mazerolle, 2002, p. 38). James and Mazerolle (2002) described nine 
general categories of cognitive bias that yield personality-specific JMs, and differential 
framing represents both a broad category of cognitive bias and the foundation upon 
which personality-specific JMs are constructed. To illustrate, consider the positive 
connotation of achievement striving bias, one of six JMs James and Mazerolle outlined 
for individuals with the trait achievement motivation. The personality-specific bias is 
described as “a tendency to empathize with the sense of enthusiasm, intensity, and 
striving that characterizes those who succeed in demanding situations” (p. 41). The 
function of this bias, as that of all JMs, is to facilitate the perception of a disposition-
related behaviors – in this case, achievement-oriented acts – as logical behavioral 
adjustments to the environment. 
Differential framing forms the basis of the positive connotation of achievement 
striving bias in the following way: The immediate interpretation of an environmental 
attribute (e.g., a hardworking, ambitious supervisor) takes a form consistent with the 
achievement-oriented individual’s underlying motive to achieve. The actions of a 
supervisor who arrives at the office early and leaves late are likely to be interpreted 
favorably by an achievement-motivated individual, and the supervisor may be described 
as “driven,” “hard-working,” and “motivated.” The positive connotation of achievement 
striving bias permits the achievement-oriented individual to interpret the supervisor’s 
behavior and subsequently conclude that the behavior is logical (i.e., in accordance with a 
need or motive to achieve). On the other hand, an individual with the trait fear of failure 
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likely will rely on an opposite bias – negative connotation of achievement striving bias – 
to interpret the supervisor’s behavior in a manner consistent with the underlying motive. 
Hence, the behavior likely will be described as “obsessive,” “stress-inducing,” or 
“compulsive” (James & Mazerolle, 2002). This is how individuals with different latent 
motives come to assign qualitatively different meanings to the same stimulus information 
in the environment: Implicit biases are mapped onto consciousness in the form of 
adjectives individuals use to describe events or attributes in the environment (James & 
Mazerolle, 2002). This is how differential framing is likely to yield discrepant judgments, 
affective reactions, and behaviors. 
The Motive-Trait Link 
Cervone (1991) observed that the study of personality has progressed along two 
relatively distinct paths, the trait/dispositional approach and the social-cognitive 
approach. Researchers in the trait/dispositional tradition have concerned themselves with 
identifying a relatively simple structure of personality traits that account for individual 
differences in thought, emotion, and behavior (e.g., Allport & Odbert, 1936; Cattell, 
1947; Costa & McCrae, 1985; Fiske, 1949; Goldberg, 1990; Tupes & Christal, 1961). 
This approach involves using natural language (e.g., conscientiousness, extraversion) to 
describe a taxonomy of personality dimensions along which individuals differ. Cervone 
refers to the alternate approach to the study of personality as the social-cognitive 
approach, and research in this domain concerns the cognitive structures and processes 
that give rise to what the layperson regards as “personality” (e.g., Bandura, 1986; 
Cervone, 2004; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Higgins, 1999; James, 1998; James & 
Mazerolle, 2002; Mischel, 1973; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). That is, the social-cognitive 
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approach to personality examines how “individuals assign personal meaning to events, 
plan courses of action, and regulate their motivation, emotion, and interpersonal 
behavior” (Cervone, 1991, p. 372). The goal of the social-cognitive approach is to 
explicate the mechanisms that account for the consistency, variability, and uniqueness of 
personality (Cervone, 2004). Both approaches pertain to differential framing, such that 
the social-cognitive process of assigning meaning to an environmental attribute leads to 
behavior indicative of a trait.    
Motives and traits are conceptually distinct. Motives refer to individual desires or 
states of affair that people would like to bring about or prevent (Winter, John, Stewart, 
Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). Motives (needs) underlie behavior. A trait, on the other 
hand, is a disposition or tendency to behave in a relatively consistent way across 
situations. Less cause than effect, “traits are comprised of more-or-less consistent, 
generalized, intercorrelated clusters of behaviors” (Winter et al., 1998, p. 233). James and 
Mazerolle (2002) outlined three principles of an emergent trait: (1) Related behaviors can 
be grouped into a general category; (2) the category is defined in terms of the behaviors; 
and (3) the eponymous behaviors consistently recur over time and situations. This 
dissertation will showcase how individuals with the motives to achieve and avoid failure 
will interpret the same environmental attribute differently because they are motivated to 
do so. Differential framing likely will then yield behaviors that come to be regarded as 
the traits achievement motivation and fear of failure, thus providing a useful account of a 




The Motives to Achieve and Avoid Failure 
Two Classes of Motives 
Atkinson (1957) defined a motive as “a disposition to strive for a certain kind of 
satisfaction … a capacity for satisfaction in the attainment of a certain class of 
incentives” (p. 360) and described two broad classes of motives in individuals. The first 
class of motives refers to appetites or approach tendencies and includes those motives 
that are instrumental in maximizing individual satisfaction. For example, the achievement 
motive is conceived as a tendency to strive for (i.e., approach) success. The second set of 
motives are those that compel a person to avoid pain. Atkinson classified these motives 
as aversions or avoidant tendencies, and they indicate an individual’s capacity to 
experience pain as it relates to certain negative outcomes. He cites as an example the 
motive to avoid failure as “a disposition to avoid failure and/or a capacity for 
experiencing shame and humiliation as a consequence of failure” (p. 360). Both approach 
and avoidant tendencies are linked to the valences the outcomes hold for the individual, 
and the roots of the classes of motives can be traced to the ancient Greek philosophy of 
ethical hedonism, which espoused the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain (see 
Elliot, 1999; Elliot & Covington, 2001).  
When faced with a situation in which their performance will be evaluated 
according to some standard, individuals are presumed to have a motive to achieve and a 
motive to avoid failure (Atkinson, 1978). In such evocative situations, the motives 
generate opposite behaviors: The motive to achieve involves approaching and 
undertaking the activity, and the motive to avoid failure engenders a desire to withdraw 
and not undertake the activity. For their function in guiding behavior, Atkinson (1978) 
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refers to these respective tendencies as excitatory and inhibitory tendencies, and the 
conflict between them is resolved through the “resultant achievement-oriented tendency” 
or resultant tendency.  That is, the two tendencies combine additively, and the degree to 
which the motive to achieve and the motive avoid failure are discrepant within the 
individual represents what Atkinson calls the “final strength of tendency” (p. 18). This 
final strength of tendency is reflected, ultimately, in whether an individual chooses to 
approach or avoid a task upon which their performance will be evaluated. Individuals 
who consistently come to approach such tasks are said to demonstrate the trait 
achievement motivation, while those who recurrently respond to such situations by 
avoiding them are characterized by the trait fear of failure (James & Mazerolle, 2002). 
The Motive to Achieve  
Among the list of human needs for emotional and mental satisfaction that Murray 
(1938) proffered was the need for achievement (n Achievement or n Ach), which the 
author conceptualized as one component of a higher-order need for superiority. Need for 
achievement was described as a need “to overcome obstacles, to exercise power, to strive 
to do something difficult as well and as quickly as possible” (pp. 80-81). Consistent with 
the rest of this paper, need and motive will be used fairly interchangeably to represent a 
force energizing, directing, and sustaining behavior (see Jones, 1955; Murray, 1938). 
Thus, in Murray’s theory individuals have a capacity for attaining satisfaction through the 
accomplishment and mastery of difficult tasks, and some scholars argue that proving 
one’s competence is at the root of the motive to achieve (e.g., Elliot & Dweck, 2005). 
McClelland and colleagues suggested that the satisfaction or “affective arousal” obtained 
in such pursuits was, in part, determined by the standards to which the individual 
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performing the task was evaluated (McClelland et al., 1953). The criterion by which an 
individual perceives his or her achievement (i.e., satisfies his or her need for 
achievement) may be determined internally (i.e., “This is better than I have ever done”) 
or externally (i.e., “This is better than most people have done”), and accordingly may or 
may not involve direct competition with other individuals (Spence & Helmreich, 1983). 
Individuals with the need to achieve are driven by a desire to demonstrate a capability in 
accomplishing challenging tasks (McClelland, 1985). This intrinsic motivation (Spence 
& Helmreich, 1983) pertains to the sheer enjoyment individuals experience in striving 
toward excellence and the mastery of challenging tasks (cf. Dweck & Elliott, 1983; 
Nicholls, 1984). As McClelland put it: 
What should be involved in the achievement motive is doing something better for 
its own sake, for the intrinsic satisfaction of doing something better. (p. 228) 
As others have observed (e.g., Atkinson, 1978; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Spence & 
Helmreich, 1983), external rewards that may attend successful accomplishment of 
challenging tasks are not unrelated to the need to achieve, but they are seen as peripheral 
to intrinsic motivation. Individuals with a high need to achieve feel personally 
responsible for their performance, are desirous of performance feedback, and tend to 
become restless with less-than-challenging tasks (McClelland, 1985). 
 It bears repeating that an approach orientation such as the motive to achieve must 
be activated by stimulus information in the environment. As described by Atkinson 
(1957), it is “presumed to be latent until aroused by situation cues which indicate that 
some performance will be instrumental to achievement” (p. 359). James and colleagues 
 18
refer to such cues as “high-press-for-achievement” tasks (James & Mazerolle, 2002) or, 
simply, achievement-oriented objectives: 
An achievement-oriented goal is one that (a) relative to one’s skill and ability, is 
personally challenging or demanding, (b) requires intense and persistent effort to 
attain, and (c) is perceived by the individual as an important and worthwhile 
accomplishment. (James & Rentsch, 2004, pp. 229-230) 
For individuals with a strong need to achieve, such situations arouse the motive and 
compel them to approach the task, devote considerable time and energy to accomplishing 
it, and persist until the objective is realized. An individual with a strong need to achieve 
is driven by a desire to show that he or she is capable of accomplishing a challenging 
task, particularly one whose probability for success is .30 to .50 (McClelland, 1985). For 
the situation to truly be evocative of the motive, individuals must be free to make the 
choice to approach or avoid the task, and the task must be personally meaningful to them 
(see James & Mazerolle, 2002; McClelland, 1985). Examples of such freely made, 
personally meaningful decisions include whether to attempt a difficult major in college, 
commit long hours in the pursuit of expertise, or strive for a promotion at work.  
 James and colleagues (1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & Rentsch, 2004) 
have identified six JMs instrumental in facilitating the behavior that comes to be known 
as achievement motivation (see Appendix A for JMs associated with achievement 
motivation). To illustrate how JMs and differential framing link motives to behavior, 
consider, for example, the opportunity bias described by James and Mazerolle as “a 
tendency to frame demanding tasks on which success is uncertain as ‘challenges’ that 
offer ‘opportunities’ to demonstrate present skills, to learn new skills, and to make a 
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contribution” (p. 41) (see Spence & Helmreich, 1983). Imagine a scenario where an 
analyst with a strong motive to achieve is approached by a colleague and asked if she has 
time to perform a series of complex analyses on an incomplete and confusing set of data. 
Nothing would compel the analyst to perform the task, and she could accept or decline 
without consequence. However, for the analyst with a strong motive to achieve, the 
opportunity bias would guide her interpretation (i.e., framing) of the task, and she would 
likely regard such a project as an “opportunity” or “challenge” because to assign such 
meaning would be consistent with her underlying motive to challenge herself, 
demonstrate her skills, and make a contribution. Subsequently (and ceteris paribus), the 
analyst would approach the project proposed by the colleague (or similar tasks), 
demonstrating a stable disposition to approach “challenges” and “opportunities” that 
could be summarized as the “trait achievement motivation.” As will be seen when the 
discussion turns to the need to avoid failure, an individual without a strong motive to 
avoid failure will rely on a different bias in interpreting the request from the colleague 
and differentially frame the request. In either case, the recurrent influence of a specific set 
of implicit biases on the interpretation of similar achievement-oriented tasks will increase 
the likelihood that the knowledge structures used in the processing of the tasks will 
become chronically accessible (Higgins & King, 1981). That is, the analyst with the 
motive to achieve will express a framing proclivity to consistently appraise demanding 
tasks as worthwhile challenges and opportunities. 
The Motive to Avoid Failure 
Contemporary rendering of something akin to a motive to avoid failure can be 
traced to Murray (1938), who described a “need for infavoidance” (n Inf) as an 
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individual’s need to avoid humiliation or “conditions which may lead to belittlement” (p. 
192). In the Murryian lexicon, n Inf referred to a psychological need to not feel inferior. 
Such a feeling attends attempting a challenging or achievement-oriented task, failing, and 
experiencing feelings of incompetence and shame. Within his discussion of n Inf, Murray 
used the phrase “fear of failure” to describe a causal mechanism that compels a person to 
avoid a task where failure could possibly ensue, and this pairing has persisted over the 
years. However, less than the fear of not accomplishing a task, the fear of failure really 
pertains to a motive to avoid experiencing humiliation and shame associated with failure 
(Atkinson, 1957). Notable is what the experience of shame represents to an individual, as 
this state is what he or she is compelled to avoid – to the point of not attempting a task at 
which he or she may or may not succeed. Shame is a “condition of humiliating disgrace 
or disrepute” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary) and is linked to how the self is 
perceived by others. Shame is tied to strong feelings of inferiority and submissiveness, 
increased self-consciousness, and hiding behaviors (Andrews, 1995). Thus, an individual 
with a strong motive to avoid failure is compelled to avoid achievement-oriented tasks 
because of anxiety and apprehension about feeling humiliated and inferior. 
Individuals with strong needs to avoid failure engage implicit biases to enhance 
the logical appeal of behavior to which they are predisposed. These justification 
mechanisms (JMs) and the differential framing to which they are linked mediate the 
relationship between the motive to avoid failure and the behaviors that come to represent 
the trait fear of failure. James and colleagues (1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & 
Rentsch, 2004) have identified eight JMs that enhance the logical appeal of behavior that 
satisfies a strong need to avoid failure (see Appendix B). These JMs function in the same 
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manner as those for achievement motivation, thus the explication of their operation will 
be brief. One such JM of individuals with a strong motive to avoid failure is the liability 
inclination, which involves a tendency to interpret demanding tasks as threats or in terms 
of the liabilities they present. For instance, if the data analyst approached by a colleague 
for assistance with a challenging data set were to have a strong motive to avoid failure, 
she likely would be guided by the consideration of all that could go wrong in undertaking 
the project (and how such occurrences would affect her). As a result of this liability bias, 
the analyst would be inclined to frame the colleague’s request as a “can’t-win situation,” 
a “black hole,” or a “risky proposition” and decline the request to help. Compare this 
framing to that of the analyst with a strong motive to achieve, who would be inclined to 
interpret the assistance request as an “opportunity” or “challenge.” Both interpretations 
are perfectly logical to the individual assigning the meaning, yet the meanings assigned to 
the request are qualitatively different. The differential framing permits each individual to 
engage in the predisposed behavior while regarding it as a logical action.  
Evidence of Differential Interpretation 
Differential framing represents fertile ground for organizational researchers, and a 
primary goal of this dissertation is to highlight its potential utility. However, evidence 
from the literature suggests an awareness of the discrepant ways individuals may interpret 
the same stimulus information in the environment. For instance, in the negotiation 
literature, Pinkley (1990; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994) has empirically identified conflict 
frames that individuals involved in disputes employ to interpret the conflicts in which 
they are engaged. Conflict frames essentially are schemata for conflict, and Pinkley 
(1990) found that different individuals focus on or assign meaning to different aspects of 
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a conflict. Outcomes such as satisfaction with the negotiation and anticipated future 
relationship with disputant were associated with the type of conflict frame employed by 
the disputant (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). Also, perhaps unsurprisingly, conflict 
mediators frame disputes in less polarizing terms than disputants in conflict (Pinkley, 
1990), and perceptions of salary “fairness” have differed as a function of negotiating 
position (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). Additionally, the same organizational events 
have been interpreted differently by individuals in different workgroups, and members of 
the same workgroup have interpreted the same events in a similar fashion (Rentsch, 
1990). In her elucidation of “meaning subcultures” within organizations, Rentsch (1990) 
used multidimensional scaling to quantitatively describe the qualitatively different 
meanings individuals assign to organizational events and urged future researchers to pay 
heed to the meanings imputed by employees and survey respondents, as opposed to those 
presumed by researchers: 
Respondents may agree that managers are willing to take chances on good ideas, 
but some may interpret this statement as reflecting risk, and others may interpret it 
as aggressive, short-sighted, or professional. (p. 669) 
Though they pertain to situational factors that predict discrepant interpretations of the 
same stimuli, these findings bolster the case for the use of differential framing as a means 
to strengthen measurement and capture additional variance within work-related 
psychology.  
 The most direct test of differential framing to date was reported in a dissertation 
by LeBreton (2002). In that study, the author created the Differential Framing Test to 
assess implicit cognitions associated with dispositional aggression (James & Mazerolle, 
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2002; James & McIntrye, 1996). LeBreton’s initial measure was comprised of 41 words 
and their possible synonyms; his goal was to determine if the same word literally meant 
different things to different individuals. Each item of the measure consisted of a stimulus 
word and four possible answers, and participants were instructed to choose the word that 
most closely matched the stimulus word in meaning. Stimulus words (e.g., 
COMMANDER, TRUSTING, TIMID) were selected for the presumed evocative appeal 
they would hold for aggressive individuals (i.e., the words would activate implicit 
cognitive biases associated with aggression). Following the stimulus words were four 
ostensibly synonymous words, though in reality only two of the words could be construed 
as synonymous. One of the response options was indicative of aggressive framing, and a 
second response option represented non-aggressive framing. The third and fourth 
response options were not true synonyms and were not likely to be selected by 
participants, thus compelling an aggressive or non-aggressive response. For example, for 
the stimulus word TIMID, the four potential synonyms were COWARDLY, SHY, 
FOOLISH, and PEACEFUL. A person with an aggressive disposition would likely select 
COWARDLY as most synonymous with TIMID, while a non-aggressive person would 
be implicitly biased to selecting SHY as a synonym. FOOLISH and PEACEFUL should 
not be selected because neither is a worthy synonym for the stimulus word. Scoring was 
as follows: An aggressive response was scored 1, a non-aggressive response scored -1, 
and selection of a non-synonymous response was coded 0. 
 Using two samples of undergraduates, LeBreton (2002) empirically keyed the 
items against a criterion of student conduct violations recorded by the university while 
acknowledging the imperfect nature of the criterion (i.e., not all violations are likely to be 
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aggressive acts). Items that correlated .30 or better were retained, resulting in a unit-
weighted composite scale composed of five items for the first sample, and a unit-
weighted composite scale of eight items for the second sample. The five-item scale 
correlated .45 with the criterion, and the eight-item scale correlated .74 in the respective 
samples. LeBreton then cross-validated the keys with the alternative samples, obtaining 
an average cross-validity of .43. LeBreton also reported several significant correlations of 
the Differential Framing Test with subscales of another conditional reasoning measure 
designed to assess justification mechanisms associated with aggressive behavior. 
Additionally, the Differential Framing Test did not correlate with self-report measures of 
aggressive behavior, consistent with the notion that biases that underlie differential 
framing are indeed implicit. As an initial step in the measurement of differential framing, 
LeBreton’s study provides further evidence that different individuals assign different 
meaning to the same stimulus.  
Organizational Culture 
At the heart of an organization’s culture are its values, a set of normative beliefs 
that have been internalized by employees and potentially guide their behavior (O’Reilly, 
Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). From these values come behavioral prescriptions or norms, 
and the shared norms, values, and assumptions within an organization may be described 
as its culture (Schein, 1996). Organizations often derive their cultures from their founders 
and leaders, who transmit the preferred values, norms, and assumptions to employees 
throughout the enterprise. Such a top-down conceptualization of organizational culture 
led one researcher to conclude that the culture of an organization may be thought of as 
the beliefs individual employees hold about what upper management believes and values 
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(Schneider, 2000; Schneider, Brief, & Guzzo, 1996). Early research adopted a 
sociological or anthropological bent, with researchers examining organizational practices 
for their symbolism and imagery (e.g., Pettigrew, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981; Trice & Beyer, 
1984) and conducting qualitative studies (e.g., Smircich, 1983). Other researchers reacted 
to the inherent challenges posed by conducting large-scale (i.e., organization-wide) 
qualitative research and began to develop quantitative measures of organizational culture 
(e.g., Cooke & Rousseau, 1988). The primary intent of quantitative researcher was to 
assess the direction and intensity of organizational culture. The direction of a culture 
refers to its actual content; it is largely represented by values and behavioral norms, “how 
things are done” in the organization. The intensity of an organization’s culture refers to 
its actual strength or pervasiveness and is a function of employee agreement on the 
direction of culture as well as the connection between expectations, behaviors, and 
rewards in the organization (Cooke & Rousseau, 1988; see also Trice & Beyer, 1984).   
Strong Culture 
A strong organizational culture is one in which employees intensely express 
approval or disapproval with their coworkers’ behavior relative to the norms, and one in 
which agreement on norms and values is widespread throughout the organization 
(O’Reilly, 1989). In part due to the influence of non-academic literature (e.g., Peters & 
Waterman, 1982), a strong organizational culture has been thought to compel 
organizational effectiveness. However, Martin (1995; see also Denison & Mishra, 1996) 
described such a relationship as a “myth,” and other researchers have concluded – for a 
variety of reasons – that little in the literature supports a link between organizational 
culture and performance (Wilderom, Glunk, & Maslowski, 2000). One possible reason 
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for such a disconnect could be that employees who hold similar beliefs about the culture 
of their organization (i.e., a strong culture) have discrepant impressions of what that 
culture actually means to them. That is, Employee A and Employee B may agree that the 
culture at their workplace is a “results-oriented” one, but they may have vastly different 
interpretations of what “results-oriented” means. Perhaps Employee A has a personality 
that predisposes her to thrive and add significant value in a results-oriented workplace, 
while Employee B has a personality ill-equipped to function at a high level in a results-
oriented environment. Differential framing represents a potential avenue to determine if, 
indeed, agreement on aspects of culture equates to similar meanings assigned to the 
culture.  
Differential Framing and Organizational Culture 
Cultures based on several scales from the widely used Organizational Culture 
Inventory (OCI; Cooke & Lafferty, 1983, 1984, 1986; Cooke & Rousseau, 1988; Cooke 
& Szumal, 2000) were developed to demonstrate how differential framing may have 
implications for the study of organizational culture. The OCI is composed of 120 
statements that describe a behavior or personal style that might be expected of employees 
in organizations. Sample statements include “point out flaws” and “question decisions 
made by others,” and respondents are asked to indicate to what extent employees in their 
organizations are expected to engage in the behavior in order to “fit in” and meet 
expectations.  
Four of the 12 scales of the OCI selected to test the operation of differential 
framing were chosen for their perceived likelihood to evoke the latent motives to achieve 
and avoid failure. Elements of both the perfectionistic and achievement cultures were 
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expected to appeal to individuals dominated by the motive to achieve (AM); the same 
features likely would not appeal to individuals dominated by the motive to avoid failure 
(FF). Additionally, it was expected that AMs and FFs would differentially interpret 
aspects of conventional and dependent cultures, with FFs embracing such cultures and 
AMs finding them off-putting. Perhaps just as important in the elucidation of differential 
framing is the selection of a cultural style that will not arouse the latent motives, and 
which likely will be similarly interpreted by AMs and FFs. Toward that end, the 
affiliative culture has been selected for discussion.  
Perfectionistic and Achievement Cultures 
The perfectionistic and achievement cultures are believed to possess 
characteristics that will attract AMs and repel FFs. The perfectionistic culture is 
characterized by the attainment of high standards, investment of long hours to accomplish 
tasks, and impeccable deliverables (Cooke & Szumal, 2000). Individuals in such 
environments place strenuous demands on themselves and others, are meticulous about 
details, and may be indifferent toward the feelings and needs of their coworkers. The 
achievement culture is reflective of employees who set and vigorously pursue 
challenging goals; employees in such a culture enthusiastically strive for excellence and 
value doing things as well as can be done. Thus, it seems likely that AMs and FFs, if in a 
similar culture of suitable intensity, could agree on the nature of the culture (i.e., it is 
hard-driving and goal-oriented). It also seems likely that the same culture could be 
interpreted differently according to the latent motives of AMs and FFs. Though not an 
exact replica of an achievement-oriented or high-press-for-achievement task, such a 
culture is expected to be suitably evocative of the motives to achieve and avoid failure. 
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Thus, it is predicted that AMs will employ justification mechanisms (JMs) that facilitate 
their interpretation of the description in a manner consistent with their underlying motive 
to approach, persist at, and accomplish demanding tasks. Conversely, FFs are expected to 
engage JMs that permit them to avoid demanding tasks out of a self-protective interest in 
avoiding the shame and humiliation that may attend failure – and to regard such an action 
as a logical one. This reasoning forms the basis of the first propositions of this 
dissertation: 
H1: Individuals characterized by the motive to achieve and those characterized by 
the need to avoid failure will assign qualitatively different meanings to a culture 
composed of perfectionistic and achievement elements. 
H2: Individuals characterized by the motive to achieve and those characterized by 
the need to avoid failure will not differ in their assessment of the intensity of a 
culture composed of perfectionistic and achievement elements. 
Were the predictions to be supported, it could be said that while AMs and FFs agree on 
the strength of a culture, they interpret the content in qualitatively different terms. That is, 
they differentially frame it. 
 Conventional and Dependent Cultures 
The conventional and dependent cultures are believed to be comprised of 
elements that FFs may find attractive and AMs will find distasteful. Tradition and an 
adherence to long-standing policy are highly valued in a conventional culture, described 
by Cooke and Rousseau (1988) as “conservative, traditional, and bureaucratically 
controlled” (p. 258). As such, a conventional culture is characterized by rule following 
and conformity, and value is placed on “fitting in.” Similarly, a dependent culture is one 
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that is strongly hierarchical and characterized by centralized decision making. Dependent 
cultures feature relatively little participative decision making, and employees have clear 
expectations and little latitude in carrying out their tasks. Here, too, it is reasonable to 
suppose seems likely that FFs and AMs, if in an environment similar to that of 
conventional and dependent cultures, could agree on the strength of the culture (i.e., it is 
hierarchical and tradition-bound). Additionally, the same culture could quite possibly be 
interpreted differently according to the latent motives of FFs and AMs; FFs likely will 
find the culture to be safe and risk-free, and AMs likely will see it as stifling and 
controlling. This reasoning underlies the second set of propositions in this dissertation: 
H3: Individuals characterized by the motive to achieve and those characterized by 
the need to avoid failure will assign qualitatively different meanings to a culture 
composed of perfectionistic and achievement elements. 
H4: Individuals characterized by the motive to achieve and those characterized by 
the need to avoid failure will not differ in their assessment of the intensity of a 
culture composed of conventional and dependent elements. 
Were the predictions to be supported, it could again be said that AMs and FFs agree on 
the strength of a culture yet disagree on what the culture actually means. 
Affiliative Culture 
 An affiliative culture is one characterized by friendliness, cooperation and 
inclusion among employees (Cooke & Szumal, 2000). Employees are encouraged to 
maintain constructive and pleasant personal relationships, and to be sensitive to the well-
being of their coworkers. Camaraderie and interpersonal consideration are the orders of 
the day in an affiliative culture. Representative items from this scale of the OCI ask 
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employees the extent to which they are expected to “deal with others in a friendly way” 
and “share” their feelings and thoughts to fit in and meet expectations. As it was 
hypothesized that AMs and FFs may agree on the strength of a other cultures of 
appropriate intensity, so too is it expected that they will agree on strength of an affiliative 
culture. However, contrary to the differential framing predicted of AMs and FFs earlier, it 
is expected that both groups will interpret an affiliative culture in a similar fashion. That 
is, the affiliative culture is not expected to arouse the motives to achieve and avoid 
failure, and interpretation of the culture will not be guided by differential framing. Thus, 
additional hypotheses of this dissertation pertain to a lack of differential framing of 
affiliative cultures: 
H5: Individuals characterized by the motive to achieve and those characterized by 
the need to avoid failure will not assign qualitatively different meanings to an 
affiliative culture. 
H6: Individuals characterized by the motive to achieve and those characterized by 
the need to avoid failure will not differ in their assessment of the intensity of an 
affiliative culture. 
Summary – Hypotheses 
The principal goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that individuals compelled 
by contrasting motives will assign qualitatively different meanings to the same 
environmental stimuli. Several types of organizational cultures have been selected to 
illustrate the phenomenon of differential framing, and the predictions associated with 
each are briefly recapitulated here. First, cultures characterized by strenuous demands, 
long hours, and the pursuit of lofty goals are expected to be favorably interpreted by AMs 
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and unfavorably by FFs. Second, it is expected that FFs will favorably interpret cultures 
descriptive of “fitting in” and adhering to policy, while AMs are expected to negatively 
interpret such cultures. Differential framing is expected to occur in the preceding 
scenarios because the cultures should evoke the contrasting motives and yield 
interpretations consistent with individuals’ latent dispositions. Finally, when assessing 
cultures characterized by friendliness and warmth, AMs and FFs are not expected to 
differ in their interpretations because the motives should not be evoked. Clarifying the 
circumstances in which individuals may agree on the strength of their organizational 
culture but differentially interpret the meaning of it should be of substantial value to 
researchers probing the link between culture and organizational effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
Participants 
Considering the relatively novel phenomenon under investigation in this study, 
two samples from different universities were used in an attempt to strengthen confidence 
in the findings. Notable differences in the samples include a high proportion (79%) of 
females in Sample 2 and elevated mean ACT scores at the Sample 1 university. Sample 2 
also was slightly older and had more age variance among its participants, while nearly 
one quarter of Sample 1 described themselves as of Asian descent. Further details are 
provided below. 
Sample 1 
Ninety-two females and 81 males about 19 years old (M = 19.46, SD = 1.3) made 
up Sample 1. Participants were undergraduates at a public research university in the 
Southeastern United States and participated in exchange for extra credit in a psychology 
course. Sample 1 was mostly White (67%) or of Asian descent (24%). The 2008 
freshman class at the Sample 1 university had an approximate mean ACT score of 31, 
nearly 10 points above the national mean (ACT, 2009). The highest score an individual 
can obtain on the ACT is a 36. 
Sample 2 
Seventy females and 19 males about 21 years old (M = 21.03, SD = 4.48) 
comprised Sample 2. Participants were undergraduates at a public university in the 
Southeastern United States and participated in exchange for extra credit in a psychology 
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course. Sample 2 was mostly White (75%) or African-American (15%). The 2008 
freshman class at the Sample 2 university had an approximate mean ACT score of 25, 
nearly four points above the national mean (ACT, 2009).   
Measures 
Conditional Reasoning Test-Relative Motive Strength 
The Conditional Reasoning Test-Relative Motive Strength (CRT-RMS) (James, 
1998) was used to assess the independent variables of this study, the motives to achieve 
and avoid failure. The CRT-RMS is an implicit measure designed to assess the degree to 
which the motives predominate in an individual. It is composed of 16 reasoning 
problems, 15 of which are constructed to tap justification mechanisms (JMs) associated 
with achievement motivation (AM) and fear of failure (FF). The CRT-RMS is billed to 
participants as a reasoning test, suggesting that there is a “correct” answer among the five 
multiple-choice response options for each item. The item stems present scenarios and ask 
participants to infer the answer most consistent with the information provided. At least 
one of the five response options for each item are logically invalid responses, leaving 
participants to choose among responses indicative of JMs for achievement motivation 
and fear of failure. The AM and FF responses are perfectly logical responses whose 
selection will depend on the implicit bias that guides the respondent. Each AM response 
is scored a +1, each FF response is scored -1, and other responses are scored 0. Scores are 
summed to yield an overall score suggestive of the degree to which an individual is 
dominated by one motive or the other, and  most people have a dominant need or at least 
a tendency to favor one of the two needs (James, 1998). Data published by James and 
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colleagues (1998; James & Rentsch, 2004) attest to the efficacy of the CRT-RMS as a 
predictive tool. 
Culture Descriptions 
To assess the dependent variables of this study, descriptions of 19 organizational 
cultures were developed by the author. Eight of the cultures (i.e., AM cultures) were 
designed to appeal to individuals dominated by the motive to achieve, eight were crafted 
to appeal to individuals dominated by the motive to avoid failure (i.e., FF cultures), and 
three cultures were written specifically to not evoke the motives to achieve and avoid 
failure. Additionally, two distractor cultures were included in the scale but not the 
analyses. The AM cultures were based on the achievement and perfectionistic cultures 
described by Cooke and colleagues, and the FF cultures were based on the conventional 
and dependent cultures; each was theoretically designed to tap the justification 
mechanisms associated with the motives to achieve and avoid failure. Culture 
descriptions were reviewed and revised in concert with the author’s advisor, the chief 
theorist behind the concept of differential framing (i.e., James), and three graduate 
students in the Laboratory of Innovative Assessment and Personality at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology. A representative AM item is as follows: 
Working on a variety of challenging projects simultaneously is the norm for 
Company G employees, who stand out by pushing themselves to consistently 
improve. Work at Company G is fast-paced and offers employees a constant 
opportunity to develop and demonstrate new skills in the workplace. Employees 
do not waste time, and the most valued employees are those who consistently 
surpass what it is expected of them.  
 35
Following each culture description, participants were asked to select which of four 
adjectives best describes the culture. Consistent with methodology designed by James 
and colleagues (James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & McIntyre, 1996; LeBreton, 2002), 
one adjective is designed to appeal to AMs, one is designed to appeal to FFs, and the two 
other options are illogical options and should not be selected. For instance, following the 
description of the preceding Company G, participants chose among DRIVEN, 
OBSESSIVE, ACCIDENTAL, and OPINIONATED. It was predicted that AM 
participants would describe the culture of Company G as driven, and FF participants 
would interpret such an operating environment as obsessive. Neither ACCIDENTAL nor 
OPINIONATED should be selected because they are not really logical descriptions of the 
culture at Company G (see Appendix C for all culture descriptions used in this study). 
AM responses were coded +1, FF responses coded -1, and illogical responses were coded 
0. To determine the “strength” of the culture, participants were asked after each 
description to indicate to what extent an employee would have to work long hours and 
meet exacting demands to “fit in” and meet expectations at the company described. 
Response options were along a 5-point, Likert-type scale ranging from NOT AT ALL to 
TO A VERY GREAT EXTENT. 
 In addition to the 16 cultures designed to appeal to AMs or FFs, participants 
evaluated three other cultures based on the affiliative culture described by Cooke and 
Rousseau (1988). These cultures should not theoretically elicit the motives to achieve and 
avoid failure as they do not directly involve high-press-for-achievement tasks. Each of 
these culture descriptions was followed by four adjectives potentially descriptive of the 
culture: one of the adjectives was a slightly positive word (e.g., PLEASANT); another 
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was slightly negative (e.g., UNAPPEALING); and the remaining two were illogical and 
not meant to be selected (e.g., VOLUNTARY). Each of these descriptions also was 
followed by a question about the extent to which an employee would need to engage in 
certain behaviors to “fit in” and meet expectations (e.g., participants were asked the 
degree to which an employee would have to “deal with coworkers in a friendly way”). 
Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire and Test Anxiety Scale 
Two additional measures that did not bear directly on the hypotheses were 
included in this study. The 19-item Work and Family Orientation (WOFO) Questionnaire 
(Spence & Helmreich, 1983) and a 20-item version of the Test Anxiety Scale (TAS) 
(Sarason, 1978) were used to assess participants’ explicit (i.e., self-reported) achievement 
motivation and fear of failure, respectively. A representative WOFO item is “I find 
satisfaction in working as well as I can,” while a sample item from the TAS is “During 
tests I find myself thinking of the consequences of failing.” Participants respond to items 
on each measure by agreeing with the statements along a five-point, Likert-type scale. 
Though often scored by asking participants to agree TRUE or FALSE with the each 
statement and summing the responses, scores on the TAS were not dichotomized because 
dividing a continuous dimension into categories may decrease relationships between 
measured variables and reduce power (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Analyses 
on these established measures were exploratory in nature and focused on the degree to 
which differential framing involved latent (i.e., largely unconscious and inaccessible to 





This study was conducted online via a secure Web site. Individuals who signed up 
to participate at their universities were issued a link to the secure site, whereupon they 
evaluated each of the culture descriptions and completed the CRT-RMS, WOFO, and 
TAS. Participants also provided demographic data and were awarded extra credit in 
exchange for their participation. 
Results 
Reliabilities 
 To estimate internal-consistency reliability of the CRT-RMS and participant 
responses to the culture descriptions, a variation of the KR-20 was computed (see James, 
2001; LeBreton, 2002). This formula uses item-total polyserial correlation coefficients 
and is reproduced below. 
 
        
 
K represents the number of items in the scale,  refers to the variance of the 
items, and  represents the product of the item-total polyserial coefficient and standard 
deviation of the item. Consistent with James (2001) and LeBreton (2002), standardized 
variables were assumed and variances were set to unity. As a result, the following 
computational formula was used to compute internal-consistency reliabilities for the 
CRT-RMS and participant responses to the culture descriptions: 
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Internal-consistency reliabilities are shown in Table 1. Though slightly modest, 
the CRT-RMS reliabilities are not totally unexpected given the three-factor structure of 
the measure reported by James (1998). The eight culture items designed to appeal to AMs 
and repel FFs demonstrated suitable internal consistency, particularly for an inchoate 
scale (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), as did the eight cultures that were designed to appeal 
to FFs and repel AMs. Reliability was not computed for the three affiliative cultures not 
believed to reflect a high-press-for-achievement task, however the three items had an 
average inter-item correlation of .68. The internal consistency of the WOFO likely 
reflects its multidimensional nature, and the TAS demonstrated sound internal-
consistency reliability. 
 
Table 1. Internal-Consistency Reliability of Measures    
                
    Sample 1  Sample 2       
CRT-RMS  0.59  0.56    
        
AM Scale (8 items)  0.78  0.78    
        
FF Scale (8 items)  0.83  0.86    
        
WOFO  0.76  0.69    
        
TAS   0.90  0.80       
 
Note: CRT-RMS = Conditional Reasoning Test-Relative Motive Strength; AM Scale = Culture scale 
designed to appeal to motive to achieve; FF Scale = Culture scale designed to appeal to motive to avoid 
failure. WOFO = Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire (AM self-report); TAS = Test Anxiety Scale 
(FF self-report). N = 173 for Sample 1; N = 89 for Sample 2. 
 
AM Cultures 
A unit-weighted composite scale was derived from participant responses to the 
eight AM cultures and is referred to as AM Scale. Polychoric correlations between the 
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AM Scale and the CRT-RMS were computed (See Table 2) because scores on each are 
believed to be categorical indicators of continuous latent constructs. Differential framing 
of the cultures would be evident if scores on the CRT-RMS and AM Scale were 
associated with one another, but among Sample 1 participants this prediction was not 
supported. No relationship between the CRT-RMS and AM Scale emerged in Sample 1 (r 
= .06), and in the smaller Sample 2 the association was of greater magnitude (r = .14) but 
still indistinct from zero. Additionally, the self-report measure of achievement motivation 
(i.e., the WOFO) did not predict scores on the AM Scale in Sample 1 (r = .08). However, 
in Sample 2, scores on the explicit measure did predict participant evaluations of the AM 
cultures (r = .23, p < .05). This finding, though not formally predicted, is noteworthy 
because it provides a tenuous link between achievement orientation and the interpretation 
of achievement-related organizational cultures. Though the AM Scale is composed of 
items essentially gaining initial tryout, the lack of relationship between the scale and the 
CRT-RMS is surprising. Several possible reasons for this discovery will be discussed in 
the next part of this paper. 
To assess the degree to which they felt certain types of behaviors were required to 
fit in at the workplaces described in the AM Scale (i.e., the strength of the cultures), 
participants responded to eight items that asked, for instance, the extent to which 
employees would have to “embrace challenges” to meet expectations at the organizations. 
Responses were made along a five-point, Likert-type scale, with greater values indicative 
of a “stronger” culture, and a unit-weighted composite scale was created from these 
responses. The mean for this AM Strength Scale (3.99, SD = .50) in Sample 1 suggests 
that participants interpreted the AM cultures as considerably strong, a finding edified by 
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participants in Sample 2 (M = 4.01, SD = .05). Contrary to the expectation that AMs and 
FFs would equally appraise the strength of an organization’s culture, however, scores on 
this AM Strength Scale were associated with scores on the CRT-RMS in Sample 1 (r = 
.23, p < .01), such that individuals characterized by the implicit motive to achieve were 
more attuned to the behaviors necessary to fit in and adhere to an achievement-oriented 
culture. Though this finding did not obtain in Sample 2 (r = .14, p = ns), the Sample 1 
result is perhaps logical in retrospect considering the schemata likely accessible to AMs 
in processing such cultures (e.g., Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Feldman, 1999; Higgins, King, & 
Mavin, 1982). That is, AMs are attuned to environments that facilitate the expression of 
their motives. 
FF Cultures 
Scoring of the eight culture descriptions believed to appeal to FFs and repel AMs 
was identical to the above protocol, except FF responses were coded +1, AM responses 
were coded -1, and illogical responses were coded 0; polychoric correlations between the 
FF Scale and the CRT-RMS were computed based on the same theoretical rationale. 
Differential framing of the cultures would be evident if scores on the CRT-RMS and FF 
Scale were negatively related to one another, and in Sample 2 the implicit measure of the 
motive to achieve correlated -.21 with the FF Scale (p = .05), suggesting that the cultures 
held qualitatively different meanings for participants characterized by contrasting 
motives. Additionally, the FF Scale had a significant negative relationship with the 
WOFO (r = -.30, p < .01), the explicit measure of achievement motivation, indicating that 
as participants’ favorable evaluations of FF cultures increased their scores on a self-report 
measure of achievement motivation declined. Favorable impressions of FF cultures also 
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tended to increase with elevated scores on the TAS self-report measure of fear of failure 
(r = .20, p = .06). In contrast to the association between the FF Scale and CRT-RMS in 
Sample 2, no such relationship was found in Sample 1.  
The FF Strength Scale was created in the same fashion as the AM Strength Scale, 
the only exception being that participants were asked the degree to which employees 
would have to, for example, “do things as they’ve always been done” to fit in at the 
described organizations. Participants in both samples perceived the FF cultures as less 
strong than the AM cultures, and the FF cultures in Sample 1 (M = 3.11, SD = .74) were 
determined to be stronger than those in Sample 2 (M = 2.78, SD = .70), t(260) = 3.45, p < 
.01. As with the AM Strength Scale, elevated scores were indicative of a “stronger” 
culture, and it was expected that both AMs and FFs would equally determine the strength 
of the culture. Support for this prediction was found in Sample 2, where scores on the 
CRT-RMS and FF Strength Scale were unrelated (r = .03, p = ns). However, in Sample 1, 
assessment of the degree to which individuals would have to engage in certain behaviors 
to assimilate in FF cultures was associated with scores on the CRT-RMS (r = .18, p < 
.05). As was the case for the AM Strength Scale in Sample 1, this suggests that AMs may 
be keenly aware of the environments that facilitate – and, in this case, thwart – the 
behaviors in which they wish to engage. 
Affiliative Cultures 
A unit-weighted composite scale was created from the three descriptions believed 
to be representative of affiliative workplace cultures. Consistent with the prediction, 
interpretation of the affiliative culture was associated with neither the motive to achieve 
nor the motive to avoid failure in Sample 1 (r = .03) or Sample 2 (r = .03). This null 
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prediction, while uncharacteristic, was intended to highlight how non-press-for-
achievement environments do not evoke the motives to achieve and avoid failure, thus 
strengthening confidence in the differential framing of AM and FF cultures. In light of 
the mixed findings with regard to those cultures, however, the impact of this null result is 
diminished. The AFIL Strength Scale was created in the same fashion as the strength 
scales for the other cultures, and though CRT-RMS was not associated with the AFIL 
Strength Scale in Sample 2 (r = .04), scores on the implicit measure were associated with 
affiliative culture strength in Sample 1 (r = .22, p < .05). As was the case for the AM 
Strength Scale and the FF Strength Scale, this suggests that the more participants were 
characterized by the motive to achieve, the more likely they were to perceive the 
behavior behaviors necessary to fit in at an affiliative workplace. As scores on the CRT-
RMS have been found to covary with critical intellectual skills (James, 1998), another 













Table 2. Intercorrelations Among Measures     
                  
 Sample 1   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CRT-RMS         
2. AM Scale 0.06        
3. AM Strength 0.23 -0.08       
4. FF Scale -0.03 0.03 0.10      
5. FF Strength 0.18 0.07 0.20 -0.12     
6. AFIL Scale 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.09    
7. AFIL Strength 0.22 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.63 -0.04   
8. WOFO 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.03  
9. TAS -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 0.10 -0.14 0.05 -0.18 0.02 
         
  Sample 2     
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. CRT-RMS         
2. AM Scale 0.14        
3. AM Strength 0.14 -0.05       
4. FF Scale -0.21 -0.06 0.03      
5. FF Strength 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.15     
6. AFIL Scale 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.09    
7. AFIL Strength 0.04 0.10 0.32 0.08 0.64 0.02   
8. WOFO 0.04 0.23 0.08 -0.30 0.00 -0.03 0.03  
9. TAS 0.05 0.03 -0.13 0.20 0.10 0.10 -0.05 0.02 
         
Note: CRT-RMS = Conditional Reasoning Test-Relative Motive Strength; AM Scale = Culture scale designed 
to appeal to motive to achieve; AM Strength = Perception of strength of AM cultures; FF Scale = Culture scale 
designed to appeal to motive to avoid failure; FF Strength = Perception of strength of FF Scale; AFIL Scale = 
Non-evocative affiliative culture scale; AFIL Strength = Perception of strength of AFIL Scale; WOFO = Work 
and Family Orientation Questionnaire (AM self-report); TAS = Test Anxiety Scale (FF self-report). N = 173 
for Sample 1; N = 89 for Sample 2. Sample 1 correlations that exceed +/- .15, p < .05; Sample 2 correlations 




 The results of this study do not unequivocally support the proposition that 
individuals with contrasting motives assign qualitatively different meanings to the same 
environmental stimuli. That is not to say, however, that this study did not generate any 
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evidence of the operation of differential framing, particularly when several of the results 
obtained from Sample 2 are examined. Considering the relatively novel means of testing 
the propositions, much can be gleaned from these data. For instance, the negative 
relationship (r = -.21, p = .05) between the CRT-RMS and the 8-item scale comprising 
the cultures modeled after conventional and dependent cultures (i.e., the FF Scale) is 
encouraging and provides partial support for Hypothesis 2. The findings indicate that the 
greater an individual is dominated by the motive to achieve (i.e., their resultant tendency 
is to consistently approach and persist at challenging, worthy tasks) the less favorably 
that person evaluates organizational cultures characterized by hierarchy, bureaucratic 
control, and centralized decision-making. Interpreted another way, the more individuals 
are characterized by the need to avoid failure, the more favorably they evaluate such 
conservative cultures. The point, of course, is that the same culture is evaluated in 
qualitatively different terms (e.g., “stifling” vs. “practical”) by individuals with 
contrasting latent motives. That is, Sample 2 participants differentially framed the FF 
cultures. This discrepant appraisal is consistent with the idea that AMs tend to become 
bored and restless in environments in which they are not engaged and challenged (e.g., 
McClelland, 1985). 
The link between motive and meaning is further strengthened when the results of 
the self-report measures collected in Sample 2 are considered in relation to the AM and 
FF scales. Scores on both the AM and FF scales were predicted by scores on the WOFO, 
the measure of explicit or self-ascribed motive to achieve (see McClelland, Koestner, & 
Weinberger, 1989). The correlation between the WOFO and AM Scale (r = .23, p < .05) 
indicates that as the more an individual describes himself as achievement motivated, the 
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more he will describe achievement-oriented workplaces in favorable terms; the less an 
individual makes achievement-motivated self-ascriptions, the more he describes 
achievement-oriented cultures in terms unfavorable to him (e.g., “compulsive” vs. 
“motivated”). The relationship between the WOFO and the FF Scale was of even greater 
magnitude (i.e., -.30), suggesting that as individuals increasingly describe themselves as 
achievement-motivated, their descriptions of conservative, bureaucratically-controlled 
workplaces become less favorable (e.g., “uninspiring” vs. “level-headed”). The same 
finding insinuates that as individuals make fewer achievement-oriented self-ascriptions, 
they more favorably evaluate the same workplaces (e.g., “level-headed” vs. 
“uninspiring”). Finally, the relationship between the self-report measure of fear of failure 
(i.e., the TAS) and the FF Scale, while not meaningful in conventional statistical terms (r 
= .20, p = .06), suggests that elevated self-reports of anxiety over failing are associated 
with favorable descriptions of conventional and dependent work cultures. These 
relationships provide further support for the notion that individual motives are associated 
with individuals assigning different meanings to the same workplace environment.  
The findings from Sample 2 provide important insights into the operation of 
differential framing and the interpretation of organizational culture, both of which were 
focal points of this dissertation. On the one hand, at least among people like those in 
Sample 2 (i.e., predominately-female undergraduates approximately 21 years old), 
individuals who are unconsciously compelled by contrasting motives – such as the 
motives to achieve and avoid failure – assign qualitatively different meanings to the same 
environmental stimuli. Ostensibly, then, this process serves to transform the environment 
in manner consistent with the underlying behavioral motive (cf. Bem, 1972; Festinger, 
 46
1957; James & McIntyre, 1996; James & Mazerolle, 2002). This is differential framing. 
Additionally, the product of this differential framing is significant for organizational-
culture research because it indicates that what is good for the goose is not necessarily 
good for the gander. Less colloquially, an organization may strive to build and maintain a 
certain type of culture, but if the organization is populated by individuals compelled by 
discrepant motives the effort may be somewhat futile because the workplace may be 
personalized in a manner consistent with the employees’ underlying motives. Of course, 
this issue could be addressed in the selection process if careful attention is paid to the 
measurement of both implicit and explicit motives – and their less-obvious implications. 
Regardless, these findings in Sample 2 provide one possible explanation for the lack of 
relationship between organizational culture and organizational performance (e.g., Martin, 
1995).  
On the surface of things, however, the findings from the larger Sample 1 do 
relatively little to inspire faith in the generalizability of the findings obtained in Sample 2. 
There are several possible explanations for why relationships among the measured 
variables were not observed in Sample 1, and the first pertains to the participant scores on 
the CRT-RMS (See Table 3 for distributions in both samples). The mean CRT-RMS 
score in Sample 1 (3.99, SD = 3.85) was nearly double that of participants in Sample 2 
(M = 2.16, SD = 4.02), t(260) = 3.59, p < .001, indicating – perhaps not surprisingly, 
considering the ACT scores associated with the university – that most of the participants 
were characterized by the motive to achieve. As further illustration of this bunching of 
scores, when Sample 1 scores on the CRT-RMS were subjected to a scaling procedure 
designed to aid theoretical interpretation (i.e., the sorting of scores according to FF, 
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Aspiring FF, Indeterminate, Aspiring AM, and AM; see James, 1998), 142 of 173 of 
participants (82.1%) were classified as Aspiring AM (N = 25) or AM (N = 117). With 
such a restricted range of scores on the predictor variable, relationships of the magnitude 
observed among measures in Sample 2 (i.e., correlations in the .20s) stood little chance of 
obtaining in Sample 1. The scores in Sample 2 themselves were bunched toward the AM 
end of the spectrum (51% AM, 16% Aspiring AM) and likely tamped relationships in 
that sample, but the mean and overall distribution of the CRT-RMS were much closer to 
those reported by James and colleagues in previous research (e.g., 2.42 and 2.73) than 
were those from Sample 1. 
Compounding the issues presented by the bunching of CRT-RMS scores toward 
the AM end of the spectrum are the characteristics of the marginal distributions of the 
AM Scale in each sample. As can be seen in Table 3, the AM Scale was highly and 
negatively skewed in Sample 1 (-1.06) and Sample 2 (-1.54), substantially more than the 
CRT-RMS. Additionally, the CRT-RMS was not kurtotic in either sample, while the AM 
Scale was highly leptokurtic in Sample 2 (2.70) and fairly leptokurtic in Sample 1 (.71). 
These discrepant marginal distributions between the AM Scale and CRT-RMS in each 
sample would have the effect of suppressing relationships between the variables. That is, 
incongruence in the marginal distributions between the AM Scale and the CRT-RMS 
makes the restricted-range issue of the CRT-RMS nearly intractable without substantial 
manipulation (i.e., correction) of observed data. Additionally, the skew of the FF Scale 
(.45) and CRT-RMS (-.31) in Sample 1 are in opposite directions, providing further 
challenge to the emergence of meaningful relationships. The incongruent marginal 
distributions between predictor and criterion variables represents a reasonable 
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explanation for the lack of observed relationships, and the issue likely involved the novel 
criteria. 
 
Table 3. Distributions of CRT-RMS and AM and FF Scales 
                 
Sample   Mean SD Skew (st. error)  Kurtosis (st. error)   
Sample 1         
CRT-RMS 3.99 3.85 -0.31 0.19 0.00 0.37  
AM Scale 0.66 0.33 -1.06 0.19 0.71 0.37  
FF Scale -0.24 0.48 0.45 0.19 -0.35 0.37  
Sample 2         
CRT-RMS 2.16 4.02 -0.35 0.26 0.10 0.51  
AM Scale 0.70 0.33 -1.54 0.26 2.70 0.51  
FF Scale -0.21 0.50 0.15 0.26 -0.91 0.51   
         
Note: CRT-RMS = Conditional Reasoning Test-Relative Motive Strength; AM Scale = Culture scale 
designed to appeal to motive to achieve; AM Strength = Perception of strength of AM cultures; FF Scale = 
Culture scale designed to appeal to motive to avoid failure. N = 173 for Sample 1; N = 89 for Sample 2.   
 
The goal of this study was to test the viability of differential framing as both an 
explanatory personality process and a means by which individuals may arrive at 
discrepant impressions of the same organizational culture. Toward this end, 19 
organizational cultures were designed with careful theoretical consideration, consultation 
with subject-matter experts, and limited item tryout. However, the data collected in this 
study essentially represent the premiere of these items as a means of testing the 
propositions that compelled the study, and as such opportunities for improvement were 
likely to be found. Though the reliabilities of both the AM Scale and the FF Scale were 
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respectable for this stage of scale design (see Table 1), there is little doubt that some 
items “worked” better than others, and this certainly affected the relationships observed 
between the CRT-RMS and the scales.  
Consider first the eight items that comprised the AM Scale. In Sample 1 the items 
had a mean correlation with the CRT-RMS of .08 (see Table 4), and ranged in association 
with the predictor from -.25 (AM-6) to .32 (AM-7). This item discrepancy is bound to 
contaminate the criterion, and post-hoc, exploratory analyses revealed an improved 
criterion when certain items were removed from the scale. Simply omitting AM-6 and its 
unexpected negative coefficient from the scale boosted the average scale-item correlation 
with the CRT-RMS to .13. Removing two other AM Scale items that were not associated 
with the CRT-RMS, such as AM-2 (r = -.03) and AM-3 (r = -.08), increased the mean 
item correlation with the predictor to .21; a three-item scale composed of items AM-5, 
AM-7, and AM-8 correlated .24 with the CRT-RMS. Similar effects were found when 
post-hoc explorations of the AM Scale data from Sample 2 were undertaken. For 
instance, when AM-8 and its negative coefficient were dropped from the scale, the mean 
item correlation with the CRT-RMS increased from .10 to .14. Further improvement was 
seen when AM-2 (-.01) and AM-3 (-.06) were dropped, as the five remaining items had a 
mean correlation of .21 with the CRT-RMS. An AM Scale composed of the three items 
that were most strongly related to the CRT-RMS in Sample 2 (i.e., AM-1, AM-5, and 





Table 4. CRT-RMS and Scale-Item Correlations 
              
       
    Sample 1   Sample 2     
AM-1  .13  .38   
AM-2  -.03  -.01   
AM-3  -.08  -.06   
AM-4  .13  .16   
AM-5  .19  .22   
AM-6  -.25  .15   
AM-7  .32  .17   
AM-8  .27  -.24   
FF-1  -.03  -.31   
FF-2  -.02  .02   
FF-3  .03  -.19   
FF-4  -.08  .03   
FF-5  -.03  -.28   
FF-6  -.10  -.14   
FF-7  -.05  -.27   
FF-8  .04  -.10   
AFIL-1  .03  .05   
AFIL-2  -.03  -.06   
AFIL-3   .11   .26     
                              
Note: CRT-RMS = Conditional Reasoning Test-Relative Motive Strength; AM = 
Culture description designed to appeal to motive to achieve; FF = Culture 
description designed to appeal to motive to avoid failure; AFIL = Non-evocative 
affiliative culture. N = 173 for Sample 1; N = 89 for Sample 2. 
 
 
Due to the extreme restriction of range in CRT-RMS scores in Sample 1, 
exploratory analyses of the FF Scale items were conducted only on Sample 2. Much of 
the evidence uncovered post hoc further suggests that enhanced psychometric properties 
associated with the measurement of differential framing would strengthen the viability 
and utility of the phenomenon. In the highly internally-consistent (.86; see Table 1) FF 
Scale in Sample 2, the mean item correlation with the CRT-RMS was -.15, and when 
three items unrelated to the implicit measure were dropped (i.e., FF-2, FF-4, and FF-8) 
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the mean correlation was boosted to -.24. An FF Scale composed of the three items most 
highly related to the CRT-RMS (i.e., FF-1, FF-5, and FF-7) would have a mean 
correlation of -.29 with the predictor measure. Like the post-hoc analyses of the AM 
Scale detailed in the preceding paragraph, these exploratory analyses of the FF Scale in 
Sample 2 suggest that differential framing as a means of measuring culture and other 






















Differential framing represents relatively uncharted scientific territory, and this 
dissertation outlined the process by which the phenomenon occurs and provided data that, 
in part, illustrates its potential impact. One goal of this study was to provide an account of 
individual differences in the assignment of meaning, thereby providing a useful link 
between the motive and trait units of human personality. The evidence observed in 
Sample 2 and post hoc in both samples suggests that motives may indeed yield meaning. 
This nascent relationship is critically important to the understanding, explanation, and 
prediction of human behavior because, as was discussed earlier in the paper, individuals 
want to believe their behavior is logical and rational. Differential framing represents, 
then, a process by which individuals transform the environment into subjective terms 
consistent with their underlying motives, thereby facilitating the expression of those 
motives (i.e., behavior). The data presented in this dissertation cautiously support this 
mediating link between motives and the behaviors that come to represent traits, thus 
helping bridge the trait and social-cognitive disciplines of personality psychology 
(Cervone, 1991). 
The application of differential framing to organizational culture was intended to 
demonstrate the phenomenon and further probe of the relationship between culture 
direction and culture strength. As previously mentioned, one peculiar finding of this 
study was that for each of the three measures of culture strength in Sample 1, elevated 
awareness of the behaviors necessary to fit in at AM, FF, and AFIL workplaces was 
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associated with scores on the CRT-RMS. Perhaps this relationship pertains to the critical 
intellectual skills generally associated with achievement motivation, or another 
explanation might exist for this relationship – perhaps AMs tend to be more schematic for 
achieving across environments  Researchers who study – and, therefore, measure – 
organizational culture would be wise to maintain an awareness that not only may the 
same workplace potentially mean different things to different people, but the actual 
awareness of the culture may depend on personality characteristics. Of course, the CRT-
RMS was not associated with any of the culture-strength scales in Sample 2, so more 
research into this question is needed. Regardless, the evidence of differential framing of 
the FF cultures in Sample 2 lends credence to the call by Rentsch (1990) for researchers 
to not impute their own meanings into employee perceptions and instead ascertain what 
employee perceptions mean. 
This dissertation also contributes to the understanding of the motives to achieve 
and avoid failure and the conditional-reasoning approach to personality (e.g., James, 
1998). At the risk of excessive recapitulation, evidence presented in this study suggests 
that AMs and FFs assign qualitatively different meanings to the same environmental 
stimulus. For years, researchers studying these motives have detailed how certain 
environments are likely to be experienced by individuals compelled by the motives (e.g., 
Atkinson, 1957, McClelland, 1985), and the data presented here suggest how AMs and 
FFs come to experience the environments. This transformative interpretation of the 
environment also strengthens a central tenet of the conditional-reasoning approach to 
personality: What is considered a logical and justified response to the environment is 
conditional on the personality of the individual doing the reasoning (i.e., the framing and 
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analysis). The evidence presented in this study suggests that differential framing does, 
indeed, operate as a broad category of cognitive bias by which personality-specific 
justification mechanisms (JMs) may be built (e.g., James & Mazerolle, 2002).  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The findings of this study bode well for the continued exploration and application 
of differential framing, but enthusiasm should be tempered by several factors associated 
with this study. Most distressing is that the results of Sample 2 did not obtain in Sample 
1. Several reasonable explanations for this lack of replication were cited in the previous 
section of the paper, but it bears repeating that the cautious embrace of differential 
framing stems from only one of the samples in this study. The primary limitation of 
Sample 1 was the compression of CRT-RMS scores toward the AM pole, thus likely 
obscuring any potential meaningful relationships. In order to better generalize the 
findings to that university’s population and beyond, a sample with greater variance in this 
predictor variable is needed. Another limitation of this study was the relatively untested 
means of addressing the predictions. The culture descriptions and ensuing adjectives 
functioned reasonably well and likely would improve with further iteration, but a method 
such as multidimensional scaling may more precisely determine how different the same 
stimulus really is to different individuals. Finally, in addition to the relatively modest 
sample sizes (particularly Sample 2) and magnitudes of the observed relationships, it 
must be noted that the findings presented in this dissertation were generated by university 
undergraduates. Given the presumed stability of the motives to achieve and avoid failure 
(McClelland, 1985), this is not a major drawback but one worth bearing in mind when 
drawing conclusions. 
 55
An issue that could have presented substantial challenge to this study but appears 
to offer optimism for future research was the capability of the culture descriptions to 
evoke the motives to achieve and avoid failure. Recall from the earlier discussion of the 
motives that they must be evoked by a high-press-for-achievement setting, characterized 
as a personally-meaningful task in which effort and persistence are required of the 
individual, success is not certain, and performance will be evaluated according to a 
standard. The ecological validity of the methodology in this study was of concern 
because it is one thing to evaluate descriptions of organizational cultures via a Web site, 
and quite another to experience a real-life approach/avoid situation in which shame and 
humiliation might arise from failure. Yet evidence generated by this study suggests that 
careful design of stimulus cultures may indeed yield approximation of the real world 
sufficient to evoke the motives to achieve and avoid failure, at least in terms of the 
measurement of meaning. That many of the culture items individually were associated 
with scores on the CRT-RMS attests to the potential viability of both the methodology in 
this study and the application of differential framing. 
 Future organizational research should benefit from the application of the insights 
generated by this study, particularly in domains that concern social perception and may 
involve individual differences in meaning assignment. Contemporary approaches to 
performance appraisal (e.g., Murphy & Cleveland, 1995) and leadership (e.g., House & 
Aditya, 1997) are two such areas that may benefit from a consideration of differential 
framing, as findings presented here suggest that behavior regarded as “driven” or 
“motivated” by one individual may be viewed as “obsessive” or “excessive” by another. 
Likewise, what one person regards as “supportive leadership” may be – perfectly 
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logically – viewed as “micromanagement” by someone else in the same situation. 
Consideration of the impact of individual motives on transformation of the environment 
also likely would benefit scholars and practitioners interested in issues related to person-
organization fit (e.g., Ployhart, 2006), the assessment of job satisfaction (i.e., is autonomy 
“liberating” and “empowering,” or “overwhelming” and “threatening”?), and perceived 
organizational support (e.g., Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). It does not require a leap of 
faith to propose that individuals who interpret characteristics of their organizations in 
qualitatively different terms, as did the participants in Sample 2 of this study, might also 
perceive support from their organizations in discrepant ways. The application of the 
concepts and evidence presented in this study would likely enrich our understanding of 
how individuals experience the workplace, thus enabling us to better predict their 
behavior in it.  
Conclusion 
This study attempted to explicate and validate a personality process by which 
individuals compelled by different motives transform the same event into qualitatively 
different terms (James & McIntyre, 1996; James & Mazerolle, 2002). Evidence generated 
by this study attests to the potential viability of differential framing as both a social-
cognitive process and a means by which the same organizational events can – perfectly 
logically – hold distinct meanings to individuals compelled by contrasting motives. These 
findings highlight the need for researchers working in organizational science and 
elsewhere to remain vigilant to issues associated with individual differences in the 
assignment of meaning and how these differences may predict discrepant behaviors. 
Further refinement of the methodology used to assess differential framing and the theory 
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behind the phenomenon (i.e., evidence presented here suggests the operation of both 
implicit and explicit motives) likely will clarify and edify the conclusions tentatively 
drawn in this study. It is expected that in future research differential framing will 
contribute to a richer understanding of human behavior and how it inevitably impacts the 




JUSTIFICATION MECHANISMS FOR ACHIEVEMENT 
MOTIVATION 
 
1. Personal Responsibility 
Inclination 
Tendency to favor personal factors such as 
initiative, intensity, and persistence as the most 
important causes of performance on demanding 
tasks. 
 
2. Opportunity Inclination 
 
Tendency to frame demanding tasks on which 
success is uncertain as challenges that offer 
opportunities to demonstrate present skills, to 
learn new skills, and to make a contribution. 
 
3. Positive Connotation of 
Achievement Striving 
 
Tendency to associate effort (intensity, 
persistence) on demanding tasks to dedication, 
concentration, commitment, and involvement. 
 
4. Malleability of Skills 
 
Tendency to assume that the skills necessary to 
master demanding tasks can, if necessary, be 
learned or developed via training, practice, and 
experience. 
 
5. Efficacy of Persistence 
 
Tendency to assume that continued effort and 
commitment will overcome obstacles or any 
initial failures that might occur on a demanding 
task. 
 
6. Identification with Achievers 
 
Tendency to empathize with the sense of 
enthusiasm, intensity, and striving that 
characterize those who succeed in demanding 
situations. Selectively focus on positive incentives 











JUSTIFICATION MECHANISMS FOR FEAR OF FAILURE 
 
1. External Attribution 
Inclination 
Tendency to favor external factors such as lack of 
resources, situational constraints, intractable 
material, or biased evaluations as the most 
important causes of performance on demanding 
tasks. 
 
2. Liability Inclination 
 
Tendency to frame demanding tasks as personal 
liabilities or “threats” because one may fail and be 
seen as incompetent. Perceptions of threat are 
euphemistically expressed through terms such as 
risky, costly, and venturesome. 
 
3. Negative Connotation of 
Achievement Striving 
 
Tendency to frame effort (intensity, persistence) 
on demanding tasks as overloading or stressful. 
Perseverance on demanding tasks after 
encountering setbacks or obstacles is associated 
with compulsiveness and lack of self-discipline. 
 
4. Fixed Skills 
 
Tendency to assume that problem-solving skills 
are fixed and cannot be enhanced by experience, 
training, or dedication to learning. Thus, if one is 
deficient in a skill, then one should not attempt 
demanding tasks or should withdraw if one 
encounters initial failures.  
 
5. Leveling Tendency to discount a culturally valent but, for 
the reasoner, a psychologically hazardous event 
(e.g., approaching demanding situations) by 
associating that event with a dysfunctional and 
aversive outcome (e.g., cardiovascular disease). 
 
6. Identification with Failures 
 
Tendency to empathize with the fear and anxiety 
of those who fail in demanding situations, 
selectively focus on negative outcomes that 
accrue from failing. 
 
7. Indirect Compensation 
 
An attempt to increase the logical appeal of 
replacing a threatening situation with a 
compensatory (i.e., less-threatening) situation by 
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imbuing the less-threatening situation with 




An attempt to deflect explanations for failure 
away from incompetence in favor of self-induced 
impairments such as not really trying or not being 























ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
AM-1 
Employees at Company I push themselves to great lengths in driving the 
company forward. Work is fast-paced and varied, with employees often tackling 
multiple challenging projects simultaneously. Employees pride themselves on 
accomplishing difficult projects, treating each task as an opportunity to 
showcase and improve their skills. Time is not wasted at Company I, and the 
most valued employees are those who consistently surpass what it is expected 
of them. 
 MOTIVATED COMPULSIVE AWKWARD DULL 
     
AM-2 
Company J encourages its employees to maximize their potential and gives 
them an opportunity to do so with a variety of challenging projects. Employees 
waste little time in pushing themselves and each other to surpass expectations 
and constantly improve their skill sets. Company J employees are busy multi-
taskers who relish hard work, self-development and advancement. 
 DRIVEN OBSESSIVE SLIGHT PASSIVE 
     
AM-3 
Company A employees relish pushing themselves to ever greater heights, often 
working long hours in the pursuit of objectives that allow them master new 
skills and stand out from their peers. Employees consistently try to exceed 
expectations, and work often involves a variety of challenging tasks. Valued 
employees at Company A are those who thrive when much is asked of them.  
 GO-GETTING EXCESSIVE CLERICAL BLANK 
     
AM-4 
Work at Company B is fast-paced and varied, with employees often working on 
several challenging projects at the same time. Employees take pride in 
completing difficult projects, treating each task as an opportunity to showcase 
their skills. Time is not wasted at Company B, and employees advance early in 
their careers by consistently surpassing expectations. 
 AMBITIOUS COMPULSIVE DRY PEDESTRIAN 
     
AM-5 
Employees waste little time in the fast-paced environment at Company E, and 
employees enjoy pushing themselves to accomplish a variety of projects, often 
at the same time. New skill mastery and development are critical to the success 
of Company E employees and the organization itself. Employees have great 
impact and consistently aim to stand out and go "above and beyond” the 
requirements of their roles. 
 COMMITTED EXTREME GUARDED SERENE 
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AM-6 
Employees at Company F challenge themselves to reach beyond their comfort 
zones in the pursuit of company objectives, and most employees work long 
hours to ensure the company remains ahead of its competitors. Employees are 
encouraged to take on a variety of challenging projects and develop and 
showcase the skills necessary to get the job done.  
 GO-GETTING EXCESSIVE BLAND SYNTHETIC 
     
AM-7 
Working on a variety of challenging projects simultaneously is the norm for 
Company G employees, who stand out by pushing themselves to consistently 
improve. Work at Company G is fast-paced and offers employees a constant 
opportunity to develop and demonstrate new skills in the workplace. Employees 
do not waste time, and the most valued employees are those who consistently 
surpass what it is expected of them. 
 DRIVEN OBSESSIVE ACCIDENTAL OPINIONATED 
     
AM-8 
Employees at Company K push themselves to great lengths in driving the 
company forward. Work is fast-paced and varied, with employees often tackling 
multiple challenging projects simultaneously. Employees pride themselves on 
accomplishing difficult projects, treating each task as an opportunity to 
showcase and improve their skills. Time is not wasted at Company K, and the 
most valued employees are those who consistently surpass what it is expected 
of them. 
 MOTIVATED COMPULSIVE UNCLEAN LAZY 
     
FF-1 
Company L is characterized by a strong centralized chain of command that 
ensures each employee knows his or her task, and employees rarely stand out 
from one another. Employees put in an "honest day's work" and value fitting in 
with the way things are done. Promotion generally occurs after employees have 
worked at the company for a certain amount of time. 
 SENSIBLE MONOTONOUS CAREFREE NOVEL 
     
FF-2 
Operations at Company M are streamlined so that employees know exactly 
what they are to do. As a result, employees work fixed hours and advance in the 
organization by doing things in traditional ways. Employees at Company M 
often work in teams and tend not to stand out from one another. 
 REASONABLE BORING CLEAN JOYFUL 
     
FF-3 
Collaboration and teamwork are valued at Company N, and as a result 
individual employees rarely are put in the spotlight. Employees generally 
advance in the company in an step-by-step fashion that rewards employees with 
longevity. Company N employees work 40-hour weeks and do not work 
overtime or on weekends. 
 PRACTICAL DULL BROAD LIBERAL 
     
FF-4 
Expectations are clear at Company O, and employees work in well-defined 
positions that require little interpretation or improvisation. Teamwork and joint 
decision making are the norms at Company O, and employees generally are 
promoted after having worked with the company for a specific period of time. 
 LEVEL-HEADED UNINSPIRING PROSPECTIVE RECREATIONAL 
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FF-5 
Employees make great efforts to “fit in” with the traditions of Company P, and 
work is predictable and manageable. Employees have relatively little ambiguity 
in doing their jobs and, thus, are rarely singled out by supervisors. Employees 
generally adhere to policy and do things “the way they’ve always been done.” 
 SENSIBLE STIFLING HAPHAZARD FLUID 
     
FF-6 
Employees at Company Q are committed to doing things the way their 
supervisors do them. As a result, employees generally do not have to take a lot 
of risks and "stick their necks out." Work tends to be relatively manageable and 
done according to long-standing tradition at the company. Forty-hour work 
weeks are the norm at Company Q. 
 LOGICAL MONOTONOUS PRORGRESSIVE MERCURIAL 
     
FF-7 
Operations at Company R are streamlined so that employees know exactly what 
they are to do. As a result, employees work fixed hours and advance in the 
organization by doing things in traditional ways. Employees at Company R 
often work in teams and tend not to stand out from one another. 
 PRACTICAL BORING NOISY MAGNETIC 
     
FF-8 
Employees make great efforts to “fit in” with the traditions of Company P, and 
work is predictable and manageable. Employees have relatively little ambiguity 
in doing their jobs and, thus, are rarely singled out by supervisors. Employees 
generally adhere to policy and do things “the way they’ve always been done.” 
 REASONABLE UNINTERESTING SLIGHT DIVERSE 
     
AF-1 
Friendliness is highly valued at Company B: Management encourages 
employees to take interest in the well-being of their coworkers, and personal 
relationships flourish at the company. A spirit of camaraderie pervades the 
environment at Company B, and rudeness and aggression are quite rare. Valued 
employees are both productive and considerate organizational citizens.  
 PLEASANT UNAPPEALING STERILE VOLUNTARY 
     
AF-2 
Employees at Company C work hard and get along with one another. There is a 
sense that people in the organization are pulling in the same direction, and as a 
result personal relationships at the company frequently develop among 
coworkers. Employees tend to regard one another as “family,” and employees 
tend to look after each other’s best interests.  
 PLEASANT UNAPPEALING FRAUDULENT MAPLE 
     
AF-3 
Friendliness is highly valued at Company B: Management encourages 
employees to take interest in the well-being of their coworkers, and personal 
relationships flourish at the company. A spirit of camaraderie pervades the 
environment at Company B, and rudeness and aggression are quite rare. Valued 
employees are both productive and considerate organizational citizens.  
 PLEASANT UNAPPEALING QUIET FLAT 





Employees at Company H are greatly committed to environmental causes, and 
decisions and actions within the organization are made with one eye on the 
bottom line and the other on environmental impact. Employees undergo training 
that highlights simple and effective ways in which the company’s ecological 
“footprint” can be minimized. Additionally, employees regularly submit 
suggestions on ways the company can improve its environmental performance. 
 SENSIBLE UNWISE DEVIOUS BACKWARD 
     
D-2 
Employees at Company Q are greatly committed to environmental causes, and 
decisions and actions within the organization are made with one eye on the 
bottom line and the other on environmental impact. Employees undergo training 
that highlights simple and effective ways in which the company’s ecological 
“footprint” can be minimized. Additionally, employees regularly submit 
suggestions on ways the company can improve its environmental performance. 
 SENSIBLE UNWISE SOFT TEDIOUS 
     
AM = Achievement motive; FF = Fear of failure; AF = Affiliative; D = Distractor. For 
AM descriptions, the first adjective is the AM response; the second adjective is the FF 
response; and the final two responses are meant to be illogical. For FF descriptions, the 
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